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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper focuses on an ex post trading problem in inter-bank money markets. An “over 
the counter” inter-bank market is modeled in this paper. Relationship banking leads to 
private proprietary information that causes bargaining failure in such markets with 
positive probability. Both independent and interdependent bargaining games are studied. 
It is shown that the allocation is not constrained efficient under bargaining games without 
monetary intervention. Monetary intervention is characterized as state contingent market 
making by the Central Bank. Such intervention is shown to dominate under a variety of 
informational and bargaining assumptions. The literature on monetary policy design is 
thus extended in the present paper by providing a micro-rationale for Central Bank 
intervention and by characterizing the solution of state contingent market making in 
liquidity.  
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 1.  Introduction 
  
The inter-bank money market is a cooperative arrangement that allows lending or deposit 
holding between banks in order to tide over short-term and long- term liquidity shortages 
and surpluses experienced by individual banks. Thus it works both as a risk sharing and a 
liquidity allocation mechanism between banks that face uncertain liquidity needs. The 
present paper examines trading problems in such a mechanism and role of monetary 
policy design to improve the allocation of liquidity.   
  
Extending the model of Diamond and Dybvig [1] to address the issue of efficiency of the 
inter-bank market, Bhattacharya and Gale [2] showed that inter-bank market worked like 
a reciprocal insurance arrangement between banks that obviated the need to liquidate 
long-term illiquid assets at a heavy discount. At the same time they pointed out that the 
market suffered from a free rider or moral hazard problem: the liquidity insurance of the 
inter-bank arrangement provided an incentive to the individual banks to invest more in 
high return and illiquid securities and less in low yielding liquid assets so as to put the 
risk sharing arrangement in jeopardy. Bhattacharya and Padilla [3] show that the presence 
of inter-bank certificate in deposits together with a no arbitrage condition interferes with 
efficient term structure of interest rate and makes allocative efficiency difficult to achieve 
in a system of decentralized financial intermediation. Allen and Gale [4] consider the 
efficiency of cross regional deposit holdings by banks when the aggregate demand for 
liquidity is constant. They show that due to incomplete markets even small aggregate 
shocks manifesting in one region can lead to contagion of bank failures. Frexias and 
Parigi[5] study the credit risk implications of inter-bank payments problems show that 
there exists mechanisms which could lead to the possibility of contagion. Rochet and 
Tirole [6] model the systemic risk in the inter-bank market. Banks face liquidity risk as 
consumers are uncertain about the timing of their consumption needs. The inter-bank 
market fails when the failure of one bank signals that other banks have not been 
monitored properly causing withdrawal behavior to become correlated. Thus the Central 
Bank has a coordinating role and the justification of the too big to fail policy is 
investigated.  
 
While it is undoubtedly true that ex ante risk sharing against bank specific liquidity 
shocks is the primary motive for the existence of an inter-bank market, and that the 
potential problems in such risk sharing exist and warrant theoretical modeling, the extant 
research has focused exclusively on this, neglecting another important problem. The 
neglected problem has to do with the potential incentive problem in trading, namely, the 
incentives faced by a bank with surplus in providing liquidity to a bank with deficit. 
Transactions in the inter-bank market are typically “over the counter” or “otc”, and this 
implies that trading only occurs through successful bargaining. Bargaining may fail in 
some cases since a liquidity-surplus bank does not know the return that the deficit bank 
gets from borrowing and can therefore overcharge. The probability of bargaining failure 
is increased by the fact that banks may be competitors in the same credit market. Mallick 
[7] discusses this in the context of an isolated bilateral bargaining game and extends it to 
a context of repeated games to show that in a dynamic context there may be too much 
liquidity in the market rather than too little. However, it is an open question as to what 
happens under more complex games with more than two banks, different information 
structures and different degrees of interdependence between the bargaining games. 
Without examining these possibilities and their implications it may be premature to judge 
the “interbank market” since the “market outcome” caused by the different bargaining 
games going on simultaneously may or may not simply be an amplifying picture of a 
“single bargaining game”. To move from the concept of a single “bargaining failure” to 
that of a complete taxonomy of “market failure” is the first objective of this paper. The 
next objective is to identify the nature of the “superior” liquidity allocation mechanism 
both under a situation where a single bargaining game is a good representation of the 
market as well as where it need not be. The literature on bargaining and competition (see 
Osborne and Rubinstein [8]) is relevant this context. Typically bargaining under 
incomplete information leads to too little trade on average if valuation distributions do 
not have disjoint supports. In such cases there does not exist any social choice 
mechanism which is ex post efficient. However, if the supports are disjoint there still may 
be bargaining failure but there may be a role for policy intervention. The assumption of 
disjoint support in the context of banking is a useful approximation to start with. Our 
assumption of disjoint support essentially stems from the empirics of banking industries. 
The first important observation is that mergers take place if two banks are sufficiently 
similar in terms of returns, assets, costs and there exist synergies (captured by the 
maximum distance between their supports) between themselves. Such mergers “eat 
away” the overlapping domains. Thus banks which are “clustered in a small 
neighborhood” are good candidates for mergers”. The second supporting fact is that 
banks which are “stand alone” are “outliers” compared to their right hand as well as their 
left hand sides. The third and very important fact is that efficiency ranking of banks are 
often quite unambiguous in the sense that the lowest possible return for a more efficient 
bank usually dominates the upper bound on the return of a less efficient bank (here we 
are talking about net returns on assets). 
 
2. Two Bargaining Games 
 
We consider two different scenarios. In the first one, individual bargaining games are 
independent of each other and the Central Bank is informationally constrained. Despite 
that we show the superiority of monetary intervention. In the second, bargaining games 
are interdependent and there is differential information. In the second case also 
intervention yields superior liquidity allocation ex post. 
 
 2A. Independent Bargaining and Constrained Inefficiency 
  
We consider a model with three banks (the analysis can be extended straightforwardly to 
the general n bank case). Initially, in state 0, three clients are matched to each bank where 
each client needs θ units of liquidity for project finance. The initial matching is assumed 
to be optimal for clients. In other words, the clients are matched with banks in a way such 
that the value of the relationship to the client is maximized. Let the maximum value of 
such relationship to each client be V. If a client is compelled to switch their projects 
across banks because the client’s original bank has liquidity constraints, then the value 
for the client falls to v where V is greater than v.  
 
Return to bank i (i =1-3) from the client-project it is originally matched with is Ri. It is 
private information to bank i only. To others it is known (with common knowledge) that 
it has cumulative distribution function Fi(Ri) over the interval [Rimin , Rimax]. It is assumed 
that Fi is twice continuously differentiable for all i. The assumption of private information 
and relationship maximization is in line with the empirical and theoretical foundations of 
banking: namely, opacity of bank assets due to proprietary information and value 
maximizing relationships in banking. 
 
In the model, subsequent to state 0, there is a purely distributive liquidity shock to the 
system such that the aggregate liquidity is unchanged but individual bank specific shocks 
are realized that are negatively correlated. The state of liquidity is common knowledge. 
Table 1 below illustrates1.  
Insert Table 1 here 
 
 
We consider a market setting where simultaneous bargaining takes place. Each bank with 
a surplus offers a price at which it is willing to lend and the bank with shortage agrees or 
                                                 
1 We consider a distribution of shocks where there is only one bank with deficit in any 
state of nature. It is shown that bargaining problems arise even with one deficit bank. 
Therefore, it is obvious that problems would be greater when there are many banks with 
deficits. Keeping this in mind the simplest shock structure is considered for analytical 
simplicity. 
disagrees. In state i (denoted by Li), bank i is in need of additional funds 2θ. If it is state 
1, then bank 1 goes to borrow from bank 2 and bank 3 (Similarly for bank 2 in state 2 and 
bank 3 in state 3). Bargaining takes place as follows: the bank with surplus funds asks for 
an interest rate - in case of L1, bank 2 offers a loan with an interest rate r21 to bank 1 and 
bank 3 offers a loan with an interest rate r31 to bank 1, and it can be accepted or rejected 
with no further bargaining taking place. If bargaining fails then one project has to be 
released by the bank with liquidity shortage and the client switches over to the bank with 
surplus liquidity. Banks with surplus funds cannot collude or interact in any other way. 
Therefore each bargaining game is independent of other games. Later we shall relax the 
assumption of independence and examine the consequences.   
 
To complete the description of the model, we need the following definition and 
assumptions:  
Definition 1: If client of bank i switches over to bank j, then return to bank j is Rij where 
i,j = 1-3 and i ≠ j 
 
Assumption 1:  
a) R1min > R12 > R13 > R2max  > R3max 
b) R21 > R2max  , R31 > R3max  and  
Ri1 – Rimax  > V – v  for all i =2,3 
c) R2min > R23 > R3max 
d)  R31 > R32 > R3max  and  
R32 – R3max  > V – v  
e) 1 / F’i{ (Rimin }> (Rimin – Rij) where i < j  
f) F’’i ≥ 0 
 
Assumption (a) says that if client of bank 1 switches her project to bank 2 or 3, the return 
to the banking system from that client falls. Assumption (b) says that if client of bank 2 
or bank 3 switches over to bank 1, then the return to the banking system from that client 
increases. Further, it says that the gain to the banking system surplus due to such 
switching is greater than the loss to the client from lower project return. Assumption (c) 
says that if client of bank 2 switches to bank 3, the return to the banking system from that 
client falls. Assumption d) says that the gain to the banking system surplus due to client 
switching from bank 3 to bank 2 is greater than the loss to the client. Assumption (e) 
guarantees positive probability of bargaining failure while assumption (f) is a necessary 
second order condition. 
 
Assumption 2 : It is further assumed that each bank has a capacity of 4θ2.  
 
Now let us consider the case without intervention. It is described as the following game 
of incomplete information : Game without Intervention (GWOI) 
                                                 
2 The above assumption reflects the empirical truth that banks operate within given 
overheads and with a fixed operational and management skills which cannot take 
business loads beyond a point without further restructuring or expansion. We consider 
such changes beyond the time frames of our discussion. The assumption is basically 
about a kind of diminishing returns in banking that allows the coexistent of different 
banks at the social optimum. Without such a capacity constraint, efficiency would dictate 
that only the most efficient bank be allowed to survive. In that case one would not only 
have to trade off monopoly distortion with the efficiency gains from allowing one bank to 
become big, but also face the fact that there would not be any inter-bank market for risk 
sharing in the first place. 
At t = 0 banks and clients are matched 
At t = 1 the liquidity shocks are realized 
At t = 2 bargaining takes place 
At t = 3 client switching takes place if any 
 
The measure of social welfare gain or loss in this context is taken into account by adding 
the changes in banking system surplus and client profits. The first proposition that we get 
is basically that a more efficient bank will essentially refuse to lend to a less efficient one. 
This creates efficiency gains since allocation of liquidity becomes more concentrated on 
the relatively efficient banks.  
 
Proposition 1 : (a) Suppose that the relatively inefficient bank has liquidity shortage. 
There does not exist any rate of interest at which the efficient bank will agree to lend 
which is agreeable to the inefficient bank. (b) Moreover this bargaining failure is also 
optimal.  [Consider state 3: bargaining failure will result in efficient switching of clients.] 
Proof : (a) Let i be the efficient and j be the relatively inefficient bank. Suppose there is a 
rate of interest at which at which there is mutual gains from trade. Now the maximum 
interest that bank j can pay is Rjmax ,but the gain to bank i from not lending is Rji > Rjmax . 
Therefore, bank i will always disagree to lend at an interest that is profitable for bank j. 
Thus we arrive at a contradiction. 
      (b) The social gain from not lending is =  Rji – Rj  - (V – v)  > Rji – Rjmax  - (V – v) > 0  
since Rji – Rjmax   > (V – v) by assumption.                  Q.E.D. 
 
But unfortunately, bargaining failure need not always be optimal. There is also the result 
that there can be bargaining failure between banks i and j when bank i (i < j) needs 
liquidity and is willing to pay a reasonable price. By assumption, this type of failure is 
inefficient.   Moreover, gains from trade exist since Rimin > Rij. However, trade may not 
take place. If the optimal value r*ji > Ri then trade fails. To see that there is a positive 
probability of this happening, it has to be shown that r*21 > R1min .  The next proposition 
shows this. 
 
Proposition 2: Suppose the efficient bank has liquidity shortage. Bargaining may fail 
even though agreement and trade is always the efficient outcome. 
Proof : For Bank j the problem is: 
max ( rji –  rd )[ 1 – Fi{ (rji }] + ( Rij -  rd )Fi{ (rji }]                                  
(1.1) 
w.r.t   rji (where rd is the unit cost of funds to banks.) 
s.t.  rji ≤  Rimax                                  (1.2) 
 rji ≥ Rimin                      (1.3) 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
- ( r*ji –  rd ) F’i{ (r*ji } + [ 1 – Fi{ (r*ji }] + ( Rij – rd )[ Fi’{ (r*ji  }] ≤ 0 ,  
 r*ji = R1min                          (1.4) 
or - ( r*ji –  rd ) F’i{ (r*ji } + [ 1 – Fi{ (r*ji }] + ( Rij – rd )[ Fi’{ (r*ji  }] ≥  0 ,    
r*ji  = R1max                                         (1.5) 
or - ( r*ji –  rd ) F’i{ (r*ji }+  [ 1 – Fi{ (r*ji }] + ( Rij – rd )[ Fi’{ (r*ji  }] = 0 ,  
R1max ≥  r*ji  ≥ R1min                   (1.6)                                                  
Note that the second order condition is:  
- (r*ji  –  rd ) F’’i{ (r*ji )} –  2F’i{ (r*ji )] + ( Rij – rd )[ Fi’’{ (r*ji )] < 0 or - (r*ji   –  Rij ) F’’i{ 
(r*ji ) –  2F’i{ (r*21 }] < 0  
The second order condition is satisfied given F’’i ≥ 0 from assumption 1.(d). 
It follows from the first order Kuhn-Tucker conditions that the required condition is the 
following:   
- (Rimin – Rij ) F’i{ (Rimin }+  [ 1 – Fi{ (Rimin }]  > 0  
or [ 1 – Fi{ (Rimin }] / F’i{ (Rimin }> (Rimin – Rij) 
or   1 / F’i{ (Rimin }> (Rimin – Rij)  
Given assumption 3.1.(c) the required condition is satisfied. In that case r*21 > R1min and it 
is then possible that bargaining may fail because there is a positive probability r*21 > R1 .             
                     Q.E.D. 
 
As the preceding proposition illustrates, Social Welfare may not be maximized in this 
kind of bargaining setup due to incomplete information. Table below gives a complete 
taxonomy. 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Note however, that we cannot characterize this situation with many banks as a market 
failure unless we can demonstrate, that a regulator with the same incomplete information 
about project returns as the market, could actually do better. Therefore, we need to 
compare the outcome of the game without intervention with that of intervention.  
 
The game with intervention is described in following way: Game with Intervention (GWI) 
At t = 0 banks and clients are matched and the Central Bank announces the mechanism of 
monetary intervention 
At t = 1 the liquidity shocks are realized 
At t = 2 bargaining takes place 
At t = 3 Central bank “intervenes” with the pre-announced mechanism with probability p 
At t = 4 client switching takes place if any 
 
What is monetary intervention? – It is defined in this context as a stochastic mechanism: 
at t = 0 the Central bank makes a credible commitment to intervene in a State Contingent 
and Transaction Specific manner at time t=3. The probability (exogenous) of intervention 
happening in the prescribed way is p. This is because the Central Bank has other goals 
that may dominate and sometimes come in conflict with its goals of efficient liquidity 
allocation in the inter-bank market.  
 
The state of liquidity is as already shown, denoted by Li where i =1,2 or 3. The other state 
variable of interest is number of transactions. We assume that the Central Bank can 
observe transactions (but not the interest rates charged) in the inter-bank market through 
the clearinghouse system. There can be two transactions, or one or zero. So the number of 
transactions T = 0,1, or 2. The intervention instruments are: 
(a) a borrowing rate (conditional on state and transactions) : BR(Li,T) 
(b) a lending rate (conditional on State and transactions) : LR(Li,T)  
The borrowing rate is the rate at which the Central bank will borrow from different banks 
and the lending rate is the rate at which the Central Bank will lend to banks through the 
discount window or through open market operations. The intervention mechanism is   
IM    =    [p, { LR(Li,T), BR(Li,T)}]     ∀ (Li,T) 
Equilibrium with Intervention is defined as follows: Stage 1 game (which is a dynamic 
game itself with offer and accept/reject sequence)E1 (after liquidity shock takes place) is 
a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium given policy IM  , 
E1 = [(rji) , D(rji)]       ∀ rji , j ≠ i, i,j = 1 to 3         in t = 2                   (1.7) 
such that  
rji ∈ arg max ∏j [Fi , IM ] ∀ j = 1 to 3                     (1.8) 
D(rji) ∈ arg max ∏i [Ri , IM ]  ∀ i = 1 to 3                     (1.9) where 
D is a binary variable representing acceptance (1) or rejection ( 0 ) of the offered price in 
the bargaining game between j and i 
and  IM  ∈ arg max { LR(Li,T) - BR(Li,T)} ∀ (Li,T)                  (1.10) 
Subject to IM  ∈ arg max  ∑j ∏j   + dS(V)                     (1.11)  where 
dS(V) is the change in surplus to the clients from switching. 
 
Here the policy of the Central Bank is the maximization of Bank revenue subject to 
achieving efficiency in liquidity allocation. This lexicographic ordering seems a 
reasonable assumption since the Central bank is primarily concerned with Social Welfare 
maximization in this context, and subject to achieving that, it will try to maximize its 
income from borrowing and lending activities that relaxes its budget constraints in other 
policy contexts. Notice that such a policy function may also help to eliminate policy 
indeterminacy and help to identify the true equilibrium in the policy game. Also note that 
time consistency of policy is taken care of by the requirement of subgame perfectness of 
equilibrium. This leads to the next proposition: 
 
Proposition1.1.3: A Complete characterization of Optimal Central bank Policy is as 
follows: 
State 1: Partial Failure: (LR(L1,1) = [R1min ] ,  BR(L1,1)  = (1 / 3θ)[R13 . θ  +  R3max .2θ] )  
State 1: Complete Failure: (LR(L1,0)  =  [R1min ] ,  BR(L1,0)   = (1 / 3θ)  [R13 . θ  +  R3max 
.2θ  ]  ) 
 State 2: Complete Failure: (LR(L2,0) = [R2min ] ,  BR(L2,0)  = (1 / 3θ)[R23 . θ  +  R3max .2θ] 
) 
State 3: Complete Failure: (LR ∈ Φ,  BR  ∈ Φ)  
Proof : From any given distribution of liquidity, the following is the Ex post optimal one 
:  
Insert Table 3 here 
 
The most efficient bank 1, should work in full capacity always since, by assumption 3.2, 
Ri1 – Rimax  > V – v , for all i =2,3 which means that it always increases social welfare to 
transfer resource from an inefficient bank to a more efficient bank.  So 4θ units should 
thus go to bank 1 and we have 5θ more units to remain to be allocated among bank 2 and 
bank 3. But bank 2 is more efficient than bank 3 and by assumption 3.2, we have R32 – 
R3max  > V – v  , which implies that bank 2 should be allocated 4θ units and allowed to 
work in full capacity. Thus the remaining θ unit should go to bank 3. Thus starting from 
any distribution that is not optimal, the Central bank’s task is to ensure that funds are 
allocated in such way that it continues to borrow from relatively inefficient banks and 
lend them on to more efficient ones until the optimal allocation is reached. To make this 
feasible, the participation constraints of borrowing and lending banks have to be met. 
  
In State 1 there are two possibilities that can require intervention: Partial Failure or 
Complete Failure. To achieve the optimal allocation when it is a complete failure, the 
surplus funds of bank 3 should be transferred to bank 1. Further, since bank 1 has 
unutilized capacity even after the transfer, more funds should be transferred until capacity 
is fully utilized. From the discussion above it is clear that it is optimal to transfer the 
necessary liquidity not from bank 2 but bank 3. Note that although borrower clients suffer 
due to breakdown in relationships, total surplus is greater since efficient banks do more 
business now: R31 – R3max  > V – v . Therefore under partial and complete failure it is only 
required to transfer 2θ and 3θ, respectively, from bank 3 to bank 1. Further, this should 
be done in a way that meets the participation constraints of both but such that it does not 
meet the participation constraint of bank 2. The Central Bank Net Revenue Maximizing 
solution is the following Open Market package:   
( LR , BR  ) argmax. Є Max. 3θ  [LR - BR ]            
s.t. 
LR  ≤ R1                     (1.12) 
LR  > Rj             (1.13) 
R13 . θ  +  R3max .2θ  ≤  BR . 3θ      (1.14)  
R12 . θ  +  R2min .2θ  >  BR . 3θ       (1.15) 
 It is easy to see that at the optimum, constraints (1.12) and (1.14) will bind and the other 
two constraints are satisfied. So the optimal open market package under State 1 is:  
Partial Failure: (LR(L1,1) = [R1min ] ,  BR(L1,1)  = (1 / 3θ)[R13 . θ  +  R3max .2θ] )  
Complete Failure: (LR(L1,0)  =  [R1min ] ,  BR(L1,0)   = (1 / 3θ)  [R13 . θ  +  R3max .2θ  ]  ) 
 
In State 2 intervention is required if the offer of bank 3 to bank 2 is not accepted. If 
accepted, 3 units will be borrowed by bank 2 from bank 3. This implies that two client-
projects will have to switch from bank 3 to bank 2. If not accepted, the optimal Open 
Market package which satisfies the Ex post (after bargaining failure) incentive constraint 
of bank 3 is the following Central Bank Net Revenue Maximizing Open Market package:   
 
( LR , BR  ) argmax. Є Max. 3θ  [LR - BR ]    s.t. 
LR  ≤ R2                                      (1.16) 
LR  > R3       (1.17) 
R23 . θ  +  R3max .2θ  ≤  BR . 3θ  (1.18) 
R21 . θ  +  R1min .2θ  >  BR . 3θ   (1.19) 
 
Note that from constraints (1.16) and (1.17), it is made sure that the Central Bank lending 
rate is too high for bank 3 to make profit from it (bank 1 is at full capacity and will not 
ask for any loan), but, bank 2 can take a loan at this rate and almost always make a 
positive profit. Constraint (1.18) ensures that bank 3 will always find it incentive 
compatible to accept the borrowing rate of the Central Bank. On the right hand side of 
this constraint is shown the revenue from accepting the Central Bank rate and on the left 
hand side the maximum revenue from not accepting the rate is shown (costs are same on 
both sides and therefore irrelevant). Constraint (1.19) ensures that bank 1 will never find 
it incentive compatible to accept the borrowing rate of the Central Bank. On the right 
hand side the revenue from accepting the borrowing rate is shown and the left hand side 
shows the minimum revenue from not accepting. 
 
It is easy to see that at the optimum, constraints (1.16) and (1.18) will bind and other two 
constraints are satisfied. So the optimal open market package under State 2 is :  
 (LR(L2,0) = [R2min ] ,  BR(L2,0)  = (1 / 3θ) [R23 . θ  +  R3max .2θ] )  
 
In State 3 the optimal allocation is achieved by the distribution of shocks and no 
intervention is optimal.                                                       Q.E.D. 
 
Section 2B. Interdependent Bargaining and Differential Information 
 
In this section, we change some of the previous assumptions. First, we assume that the 
Central bank knows the returns from client projects with perfect certainty but does not 
know the state of liquidity. Now assume that each bank has one client who requires 3θ 
units of cash for financing its project. If the client gets 2θ units of cash it will not switch. 
In a sense, we are using an assumption about stronger relationship orientation in banking. 
Further, we assume that liquidity distribution is slightly different in the sense that banks 
have committed funds. This ensures that banks with surplus can trade the funds they have 
received by liquidity shocks only and nothing else. If a fund is committed beforehand to 
an existing client, then that fund cannot be sold through bargaining to a bank with 
shortage. Now consider the following liquidity distribution given in the table below. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
Bargaining takes place in two rounds. Each bank with a surplus offers a price at which it 
is willing to lend and the bank with shortage agrees or disagrees. If both bargaining 
succeeds or fails then there is no further bargaining. But if one surplus bank is able to sell 
funds, while another is not, then the former goes to borrow from the latter in order to re-
lend to the shortage bank at the original price. 
The client switching assumption implies that either there is complete bargaining failure in 
which case (provided there is no policy intervention) client will switch to other banks or, 
there is no failure. The latter means that since a client will not switch in case of partial 
failure, the bank with surplus with whom bargaining failed in the first round will find it’s 
extra funds lying idle and lend to the other surplus bank. We assume there is an outside 
rate of return for idle funds that will be applicable in the determination of the second 
round of bargaining.   
 
The objective function of bank 2 in state 1 is : 
Π2 = θ (r21 – rd)[1-F(r21)][1-F(r31)] + θ (ra – rd)[F(r21)][1-F(r31)] + θ (2r21 – rd - ra 
)[F(r31)][1-F(r21)] 
+ θ (r12 – rd)[F(r21)][F(r31)](1-p) + θ (ra – rd)[F(r21)][F(r31)](p)  
The first term shows what happens when both the first round bargaining games (between 
1 and 2 and 1 and 3) succeed. The second term shows that when bank 2’s ask price is 
rejected and that of bank 3 is accepted, bank 2 gives the surplus fund to bank 3 in the 
second round of bargaining. Since the outside option for bank 2 is ra therefore the bank 3 
only pays that amount. The third term shows that when bank 3’s ask price is rejected and 
that of bank 2 is accepted, bank 3 gives the surplus fund to bank 2 in the second round of 
bargaining The fourth term shows the case when there is complete failure in the first 
round and the Central Bank cannot intervene, client switching takes place. Final term 
shows that in the event of complete bargaining failure, and Central Bank intervention, the 
optimal borrowing rate for the Central Bank is simply ra. Similarly, one can set up the 
objective function for bank 3. Due to the possibility of client switching from one lender 
to another lender, the probability of bargaining failure is smaller if the outside option is 
not too attractive. However, with  a low enough outside option, complete bargaining 
failure is a possibility if p is small, leading to inefficient client switching taking place in 
state 1 and 2. The question that arises is what is the optimal Central Bank policy under 
such circumstances? 
 
The Optimal Monetary Policy is such that 2θ units of liquidity is allocated to bank 1 
through a contract that only bank 1 will accept in state 1, θ units of liquidity is allocated 
to bank 2 that only bank 2 will accept in state 2 and nothing is offered to bank 3. Note 
that, if the same amount of liquidity is offered to both banks 1 and 2, then one bank will 
mimic the other. Essentially, we face the following mechanism design problem:  
Max (R1m - ra )2θ +  (R2m - ra )1θ 
With respect to (R1m ) , (R2m ). 
Subject to  
(R1-R1m)2θ≥0                                                   (3.1) 
(R1 - R1m )2θ  ≥  (R1 – R2m )1θ                          (3.2)  
(R2 – R2m )1θ  ≥  0                                (3.3)  
(R2 – R2m )1θ  ≥  (R2 – R1m )2θ                                             (3.4) 
 Solution: The incentive constraint for bank 1 binds and the participation constraint for 
bank 2 binds. Therefore, we get the following proposition: 
Proposition 3.3.3.1 : The optimal lending rates are as follows : R1m  = (R1 + R2 ) / 2  and 
R2m  = R2 
 
Bank 1 is charged a price that bank 2 will not be able to afford, and it is efficient to lend 
more at that price to bank 1 while bank 2 gets a smaller package. This monetary 
mechanism can be implemented through differential pricing scheme in discount window 
lending or through open market operations involving nonlinear pricing of bonds. 
 
3.  Conclusion 
 
The essential point about the present paper is that liquidity allocation will not be efficient 
and intervention by the Central Bank by market making in liquidity can improve the 
allocation. Due to incomplete information, bargaining may fail even if gains to trade 
exist. Naturally, the question arises as to what kind of intervention is needed which can 
improve social welfare defined as the sum of profits in the banking system and the profit 
from client-projects. When we consider constrained efficiency with independent 
bargaining we see that efficiency can be restored through a lending and borrowing 
package suitably designed to meet incentive compatibility and participation constraints of 
the lenders and borrowers. With interdependent bargaining, there is either full trade or no 
trade. When Central Bank knows the returns but not liquidity (differential information) 
again the first best can be attained by a mechanism design problem.  
 
Thus the Central Bank efficiency persists in a variety of circumstances and it is quite a 
significant and reassuring result. The results suggest a micro-rationale behind monetary 
policy design: to reallocate liquidity to increase social welfare. However, it will be 
instructive to extend the present model to more complex scenarios with repeated 
interaction among heterogenous banks. 
Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Liquidity position of the banking system without aggregate shocks 
 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 
State 0 = L0 3θ 3θ 3θ 
State 1 = L1 θ 4θ 4θ 
State 2 = L2 4θ θ 4θ 
State 3 = L3 4θ 4θ θ 
 
Table 2: Efficiency Properties of Likely Outcomes 
 Efficiency Properties of Likely Outcomes 
State 1 No Bargaining 
Failure (efficient) 
Partial Bargaining 
Failure 
(inefficient) 
Complete 
Bargaining Failure 
(inefficient) 
State 2 No Bargaining 
Failure 
(impossible) 
Partial Bargaining 
Failure  
(efficient) 
Complete 
Bargaining Failure 
(inefficient) 
State 3 No Bargaining 
Failure 
(impossible) 
Partial Bargaining 
Failure 
(impossible) 
Complete 
Bargaining Failure 
(efficient) 
 
Table 3: Optimal Liquidity Distribution 
 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 
Liquidity 4θ 4θ θ 
 
 
Table 4: Deficits or surpluses with respect to committed funds 
 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 
State O 0 0 0 
State 1 - 2θ + 1θ + 1θ 
State 2 + 1θ - 2θ + 1θ 
State 3 - 2θ + 1θ - 2θ 
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